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Abstract 
This paper tracks changes in the national disaster management system with 
regard to the nonprofit sector by looking at the roles ascribed to nonprofit 
organizations in the Federal Response Plan (FRP), National Response Plan (NRP), 
and National Response Framework (NRF). Additionally, the data collected from 
news reports and organizational after action reports about the inter-
organizational interactions of emergency management agencies during the 
September 11th attacks and Hurricane Katrina are analyzed by using network 
analysis tools. The findings of the study indicate that there has been an increase in 
the interactions of the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters 
(NVOAD) network member organizations on par with policy changes in the NRP to 
involve nonprofit organizations in the national disaster planning process. In 
addition, those organizations close to the center of the network experienced 
enhanced communication and resource acquisition allowing them to successfully 
accomplish their missions, a finding that supports the development of strong 
network connections.  
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1. Introduction 
As the 21st century began with its unique challenges and complexities, there 
emerged a necessity for the integration of actions of response organizations 
across political jurisdictions and organizational sectors under the umbrella of a 
unified national disaster system. Throughout American history, charitable 
nonprofit organizations have had important roles and responsibilities in disaster 
relief. In the past, nonprofit organizations, such as the American Red Cross, were 
the primary first responders to disasters when government actors were not 
carrying the burden of saving citizen lives and properties. Governments started 
getting involved in disaster response in the early 20th century, and the role of the 
federal government in disaster management has expanded steadily since due to 
the increasing scope and impact of natural and manmade disasters. During this 
time the United States Congress chartered the American Red Cross to assume a 
major role in national emergency relief planning and response. After the 
September 11th attacks, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) was revised, and the role 
of nonprofit organizations expanded and became more formalized and the 
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) came to occupy an 
important role in the coordination of nonprofit organizations in the National 
Response Plan1. 
NVOAD is a platform for nonprofit organizations to coordinate their activities 
and share information and resources in helping (potential and actual) disaster 
victims throughout the preparedness, response, and recovery phases of 
emergency management2. NVOAD was founded in 1970 after Hurricane Camille 
to avoid service duplication, share information among nonprofit organizations, 
and to communicate with the public in a more effective and coordinated manner 
through regular meetings among member agencies3. It has a growing pool of 
members including: 50 national nonprofit organizations, 55 state or territorial 
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOADs), and partners, such as the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (footnote 2). Due to a growing need for 
the contributions of nonprofit organizations in disaster relief and the increasing 
number, scope, and impact of disasters, NVOAD members have created standing 
                                                          
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report 1999: Federal Response Plan. 
http://www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/ 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report 2008: National Response Framework. 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf 
2 NVOAD, 2008: About US. www.nvoad.org. 
3 React Online. NVOAD: National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster. 
http://www.reactintl.org/nvoad.htm 
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committees to address issues in a more specialized and continual manner4. This 
increased coordination of nonprofit organizations in disaster response offers a 
unique opportunity to study the effect of these service delivery networks in 
disaster response. 
The paper proposes several functional arguments to explain why nonprofit 
organizations coordinate services, share information and resources, and how 
rational and social choice theories offer some additional insights into 
understanding ongoing response behaviors. At the intersection point of both 
theories, resource dependency theory argues that organizations formulate their 
internal and external strategies to maintain independence, and at the same time, 
attempt to survive (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; as cited in Hill and Lynn, 2003). To 
examine the nonprofit collaboration a network perspective and analysis is used, 
which is a process that has gained significant interest among scholars of public 
and nonprofit management (Guo and Acar, 2005; O’Toole, 1997; Provan, Veazie, 
Staten, and Teufel-Shone, 2005; Rethemeyer and Hatmaker, 2008; Robinson, 
2006). Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz (1994) highlight the contributions of network 
analysis to inter-organizational analysis and organizational theory. This study goes 
beyond thinking of ‘network’ as a metaphor and develops an empirical 
examination of networks. This type of network analysis constitutes a field of 
substantial interest and importance to democratic societies that are seeking to 
manage problems of public service delivery with innovative means at a reasonable 
cost. 
This article examines the following questions: What is the role of NVOAD in 
national disaster response? What were the structural positions of NVOAD 
member organizations in the disaster response networks of 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina? How has the role of NVOAD evolved in national response plans as well as 
actual disaster response networks? Network analysis tools are utilized to analyze 
data collected from newspapers and FEMA situation reports using content 
analysis during both the September 11th attacks and Hurricane Katrina. An analysis 
of the development of NVOAD’s role in the United States’ national disaster 
response is conducted by comparing the ways in which member nonprofit 
organizations responded differently during the attacks on September 11th, 2001 as 
opposed to the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
The National Response Framework (NRF) includes NVOAD as the organization 
responsible for coordinating the nonprofit sector organizations response, as 
opposed to both the Federal Response Plan and National Response Plan which did 
                                                          
4 Susan Kim, 2002, What is NVOAD? Disaster News Network. 
http://www.disasternews.net/news/article.php?articleid=2948 
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not include NVOAD. Empirical evidence of how NVOAD members have actually 
responded to disasters is useful in evaluating whether the NRF has worked 
effectively or not. Rather than focusing on hypothesis testing, this study uses 
network analysis to examine the role of nonprofit organizations in disaster 
response and provides policy recommendations to improve emergency and 
disaster response through more effective involvement of the nonprofit sector.  
2. Literature Review and Background Information 
Nonprofit organizations play important roles in solving social problems and 
responding to the needs in the community (Gronbjerg and Paarlberg, 2001). The 
effectiveness of nonprofit organizations in a community depends on the resource 
sharing of nonprofit organizations among themselves and among other sectors 
(Agranoff 2005; Paarlberg and Varda, 2009; Salamon, 1987). Nonprofit 
organizations’ involvement in disaster response requires the collaborative 
capacity of multiple sectors and jurisdictions. Collaborative capacity building is a 
difficult task for public and nonprofit managers. Capacity building and effective 
performance requires fostering relationships and forming creative teams and 
networks (Galaskiewicz and Rauschenbach, 1988; Kapucu and Van Wart, 2006; 
Keifer and Montjoy, 2006; Kenis and Provan 2009; Senge et al., 2008). 
Collaborative and network perspectives using network analysis techniques can 
help public and nonprofit managers improve the effectiveness of their services 
(intra-organizational or interorganizational levels) in the following ways: identify 
points of misalignment and accelerate collaboration in the right places; determine 
whether certain organizations and functions are achieving the connectivity 
required for desired results and to identify and track intervention strategies; and 
identify high performers in a network and determine the reasons for success, and 
in turn, replicating that success with low performing actors in the network (Cross 
and Thomas, 2009; Gray, 1989; Provan, Veazie, Staten, and Teufel-Shone, 2005). 
In responding to a disaster of extreme magnitude, nonprofit organizations 
usually have to deal with “the challenge of channeling the desire to help to the 
right place at the right time” (Miller, Jensen, and Moore, 2005, p. 2). First, the pre-
disaster training of workers becomes difficult during extreme events, and the 
amount of unsolicited donations coupled with the number of unaffiliated 
volunteers pose important challenges for nonprofit organizations in effectively 
organizing their response to disasters (Miller, Jensen, and Moore, 2005). Pre-
disaster training in the effective management of public information, in setting up 
a Voluntary Coordination Team and Reception Center in collaborating with the 
Public Information Office of a local Emergency Operation Center, and in 
maintaining a database of volunteers can help nonprofit organizations better 
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organize and coordinate their response to emergencies (Miller, Jensen, and 
Moore, 2005; Zakour and Gillespie, 1998). 
In dealing with these problems, nonprofit organizations are increasingly 
partnering within and across organizational sectors. “[T]he creation of synergy 
through partnership produces results that partners could not obtain without 
collaboration” (Brown, 1990; as cited in Lister, 2000, p. 4). Nonprofit 
collaborations usually operate at the interpersonal level, and these personal 
relationships are frequently minimized in management theory (Lister, 2000). If 
one of the goals in disaster management is the incorporation of community-based 
groups, then interpersonal relationships take on added importance in decision 
making and in the sharing and maximization of social capital resources and 
expertise (Wachtendorf and Kendra, 2004). 
To understand nonprofit collaboration and partnerships, it is useful to take a 
look at some definitions and conceptual developments in several theories. 
“Partnership refers to any intentionally collaborative relationship between two or 
more organizations from multiple sectors (public, private and nonprofit) which 
joins resources to identify, and subsequently pursue, a joint approach to solving 
multiple common problems” (Kapucu, 2006, p. 207). The need for complementary 
resources is one of the key drivers of inter-organizational cooperation in dynamic 
environments of disasters. Organizations with responsibilities in disaster response 
and recovery, that have strong working relationships on a daily basis, will function 
better in the dynamic environment of disaster. The pervasive threats of man-
made and natural disasters create a situation of ‘shared risk’ for the entire society 
(Grunder, 2004; Kapucu, 2006; Zakour and Gillespie, 1998). The unprecedented 
demand to respond quickly to disasters and to be part of a recovery effort 
requires two basic management skills from every organization – collaboration and 
adaptation to change. 
Nonprofit partnerships include operations at three levels: administrative, 
policy, and institutional. The partnership process encourages collective action and 
capacity building, more effective decision making and implementation, and more 
community involvement and commitment to the success of the policies and 
programs (Gazley and Brudney, 2007; Kenis and Provan 2009). Designing inter-
organizational coordination and informed collective action in response to 
disasters can better serve the immediate need in the society (Hossain and Kuti, 
2009; Kapucu, 2006).  
In order for the partnerships to be effective, there needs to be viable 
communication, the capacity for partnering, and a commitment to collaborate. 
Kapucu (2007) found that there was a need to have previously established 
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patterns of communication between the disaster response team and local 
nonprofit organizations. In addition, there needed to be a commitment to 
supporting and building the organizational capacity of these nonprofits enabling 
them to successfully partner in the response and recovery process.  
In addition to functional and operational arguments for nonprofit 
partnerships and collaboration, some theoretical arguments exist. Both social 
choice theory and resource dependence theory posit that organizations, when 
interacting with the environment, respond to both the opportunities and 
challenges found there. For example, in a study analyzing emergency managers’ 
strategies in terms of resource and funding provision, McGehee and Andrew 
(2009) found that managers strive to form strategic and key professional ties with 
those who have access to, information about, and granting power for the funding 
sources provided by state or federal governments. Provan and Milward (1991) 
argue that inter-organizational relations are basically due to the need to reduce 
environmental uncertainty and increase access to scarce resources. Shen and 
Shaw (2004) classify such dependencies in three categories: sharing, flow and fit. 
Accordingly, "[s]haring dependency occurs when multiple activities need to use the 
same resources. Flow dependency appears when the output of one activity is the 
input of another. Finally, fit dependency arises as the outputs of multiple activities 
need to fit into a single product (resource)" (Shen and Shaw, 2004, p. 2114). 
However, not all responses are determined by a rational goalbased assessment of 
the situation (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; as cited in Hill and Lynn, 2003). Some 
organizations might be more motivated to seek collaboration with resource-rich 
organizations during emergencies due to resource dependency. According to 
Monge and Contractor (2003), both exchange and dependency theories have a 
role in the study of inter-organizational networks, and several studies utilizing 
resource dependency theory include an organization's network centrality as part 
of their assessment (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1994). These theories then 
provide the basis for examining an organization’s centrality with a specific 
network and the degree of collaboration that occurs in response to a disaster. In 
the following section the value of partnerships in response to disasters is 
expanded.   
Figure 1 provides a diagram that explains the ways in which nonprofit 
partnerships make the disaster response more effective through networks and 
collaboration. In the pre-disaster phase the clarification of roles is critical along 
with capacity and network building to establish social capital and commitment to 
share information and resources during a disaster response. Establishing a local-
level database, including information about the suppliers of physical, 
informational, and human resources, can be useful to increase the collaborative 
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capacity as well as the awareness and resilience of the community (Gazley and 
Brudney, 2007; Graddy and Wang, 2009; Troy, Carson, Vanderbeek, and Hutton, 
2007). During the disaster response communication, collaboration, coordination, 
and cooperation are important in the delivery of services and in the recovery 
phase (see footnote 4). In addition, the sharing of resources and risk are critical to 
effective response and successful collaboration. This model of partnerships 
provides benchmarks for assessing the quality of collaborative disaster response. 
The next section of the paper discusses the attempt by the National 
Voluntary Organizations in Disaster (NVOAD) to formalize the networking and 
collaborative efforts. 
 
 
Figure 1. Disaster response diagram of nonprofit partnerships 
Notes: 4Cs are coming from the VOAD mission (see footnote 4). 
3. Nonprofit Organizations in Disaster Management 
Emergency managers need to have clear working relationships with nonprofit 
organizations involved in disaster management (Sylves, 2009). The leading single 
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nonprofit organization involved in disaster management is the American Red 
Cross (ARC). Since its inception, ARC has focused on assisting individuals in times 
of crisis and in Federal Response Plan functions as a "federal agency" helping to 
coordinate mass care resources in presidentially declared disasters or 
emergencies. The American Red Cross, as a representative of nonprofit 
organizations in the Federal Response Plan, provides support in the coordination 
of disaster management services. These services include providing the disaster-
affected population shelter, food, first aid, the distribution of emergency relief 
items, disaster welfare information, and family reunification services (see 
footnote 1, p. 102). 
Many other smaller nonprofit organizations provide services to disaster-
affected populations as part of their mission. However, their roles have been less 
prominent than the American Red Cross. Many nonprofit organizations have 
joined the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD), and as 
stated earlier, it was founded in order to avoid service duplication by sharing 
information among nonprofit organizations and communicating with the public in 
a more effective and coordinated manner through regular meetings with the 
member agencies (footnote 3, Sylves, 2008). In other words, NVOAD is a coalition 
that provides a platform for its 105 member organizations to communicate, 
collaborate, coordinate, and cooperate, with the actual services being provided by 
the member organizations. Because of the increasing need for the contributions 
of nonprofit organizations in disaster relief, and the growing number, scope and 
impact of disasters, NVOAD Standing Committees were set up to better deal with 
issues in a more specialized and continual way (see footnote 4). Some of the 
topics addressed by these committees are disaster case management, disaster 
recovery, emotional and spiritual cares, mass care, and volunteer management. 
NVOAD’s mission to coordinate nonprofit activities has taken on new 
importance after the failures of inter-organizational communication and 
coordination in the deadly attacks of September 11th because timely and 
coordinated action is not only important for fire and police departments but also 
for nonprofit organizations that fill in the gaps in disaster response. The goals of 
NVOAD focus on the development of the capacity and competencies of state and 
local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOADs) to make sure that they 
are well prepared and sufficiently equipped to fulfill their disaster mitigation, 
response and recovery missions effectively (see footnote 4, Sylves, 2008). NVOAD 
has several membership criteria including transparency and accountability; the 
type of service provided, participation requirements, and standards of conduct 
and service delivery. Moreover, there are some requirements based on the size of 
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budget, number of staff and volunteers, and years of experience depending on 
which one of the two tiers the member will operate (see footnote 2). 
The role of nonprofit agencies in the National Response Plan (NRP) and 
National Response Framework (NRF) is to collaborate with first responders and all 
levels of government in providing disaster relief services that sustain life, address 
the physical and emotional distress of individuals, and promote the recovery of 
disaster victims when assistance is not available from other sources. The 
American Red Cross and NVOAD are the leading nonprofit organizations that 
respond to disasters by providing leadership in the coordination and integration 
of the overall Federal efforts in the areas of mass care, housing, and human 
services. "For the purposes of the National Response Plan, the American Red Cross 
functions as an ESF primary organization in coordinating the use of Federal mass 
care resources in the context of Incidents of National Significance" (see footnote 1, 
p. 20). 
Although there has never been a study to verify their role in the emergency 
management process, the actual impact of the American Red Cross and the 
nonprofit members of NOVAD in coordinating and collaborating in disaster 
response and recovery has been implied. This study seeks to provide insight into 
the centrality of the roles played by nonprofit organizations in disaster response 
and recovery, and the methodology of the study will be covered in the next 
section of the paper.  
4. Methodology 
This research focuses on the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World 
Trade Center in New York City and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005. In 
order to evaluate the nonprofit organizations’ response to these two catastrophic 
disasters within the Federal Response and the National Response Plan, the 
authors carefully reviewed several key documents studying the interactions of 
NVOAD member organizations and tracking changes in their connectivity. The two 
cases utilize the data from the content analyses of news reports in The New York 
Times and situation reports from FEMA. Content analyses were used to identify 
the major organizations that participated in the response operations and in the 
interactions between organizations in response operations for both of these 
events (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002; Scott, 2000). 
Content analysis is a useful method of listing both attribute and relational 
data regarding organizations that have participated in disaster response in the 
first three weeks after a disaster has occurred. The Lexis-Nexis program helps to 
identify newspaper and situation reports published on specific dates by using key 
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words like “September 11th attacks”, “9/11”, “Hurricane Katrina”, etc. Once the 
analyses are complete, a matrix of interactions among organizations is created to 
analyze the network of communications and interactions. 
Archival data is preferred for the study for several reasons. First, it can 
provide network data that would otherwise not be available. Second, potential 
interviewers might refuse participation to the research. Third, organizations might 
dissolve or merge with others making them unavailable for study. Finally, archival 
data can be available for an extended period of time (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). 
This analysis illustrates the patterns of communication among organizations. Data 
collected from the content analysis was examined by using the UCINET Version 
6.0 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002) social network analysis program. 
UCINET is a comprehensive program for the analysis of social networks. The 
program contains several network analytic routines (e.g., centrality measures, 
dyadic cohesion measures, positional analysis algorithms, clique measures, etc.) 
and general statistical and multivariate analysis tools, such as multidimensional 
scaling, correspondence analysis, factor analysis, cluster analysis, and multiple 
regressions (Gould and Fernandez, 1989; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
The September 11th content analysis data are collected from news reports in 
The New York Times between the dates of 09/12/2001 – 10/04/2001; and 
situation reports from the FEMA between the dates of 09/11/2001 – 10/04/2001. 
The Hurricane Katrina case utilizes the data from the content analyses of news 
reports in The New York Times between the dates of 08/29/2005 – 09/18/2005; 
and situation reports from the FEMA between the dates of 09/11/2005 – 
10/04/2005. In addition, the following reports are also used: Florida State 
Emergency Response Team (SERT) Situation Reports; New Orleans City Situation 
Reports; Louisiana State Situation Reports; Mississippi State Situational Reports; 
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Townsend, 2006); 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 5 ; and the U.S. House of 
Representatives6 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Katrina: A Failure of Initiative. Content analysis of the Hurricane 
Katrina case began with the June 1, 2005 reports because there were no reported 
storms in June or July of the 2005 hurricane season and ran through February 28, 
2006.  
                                                          
5 U.S. Senate Committee of Homeland Security and Government Affairs. Report 2006. Hurricane 
Katrina: A National Still Unprepared. Washington D.C. Government Printing Office. 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/ExecSum.pdf 
6 U.S. House of Representatives.report  2006. Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Katrina: A Failure of Initiative. Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office. http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm 
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5. Findings and Discussion 
Centrality measures are used to indicate how central an organization’s 
position is in the network (Durland and Fredericks, 2006; Kar and Hatmaker, 
2008). There are three types of centrality measures in the tables below. First, 
degree centrality estimates the actor’s centrality in the network in terms of their 
number of ties (Kapucu, 2006). Second, closeness centrality measures the 
centrality of network actors by determining how close each actor is to the other 
actors in terms of the shortest possible path. Third, betweenness centrality 
measures the position of an actor in the network with respect to its geodesic path 
between other actors, and it indicates the extent to which it is capable to act as a 
broker (Hanneman, 2001). Clique analysis demonstrates subgroups within a 
network in which all members of a subgroup are connected to one another 
(Belotti, 2009; Hossain and Kuti, 2009). In the section below a visual 
representation of the network analysis is presented along with several tables that 
cover all the centrality measures and clique analysis findings. 
5.1. Nonprofit Organizations’ Network in Response to September 11th Terrorist 
Attacks 
Network analysis provides a visual representation of the interactions 
between organizations identifying those organizations central to the coordination 
of the response effort. Figure 2 is a network diagram that illustrates interactions 
among the various organizations involved in emergency response during and after 
the September 11th attacks. 
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Figure 2. Map of NVOADs and other Nonprofit organizations in 9/11 Emergency 
Legends: Red Squares (NVOAD members), Green Squares (Other Non-profit 
Organizations), Dark Red Squares (Other VOADs), Blue Squares (Other 
Organizations) 
Organizations on the top left side of the map are isolates, meaning they have 
no reported interaction. The network is dense in the center and scattered across 
peripheries. NVOAD member organizations (red), albeit few, occupy positions 
close to central actors such as FEMA. Other VOADs (brown) and nonprofit 
organizations (green) are similarly located. 
Table 1 (above) shows the following: the top 5, mid 5, and lowest 5 
organizations ordered according to their degree centrality measures. Degree 
centrality estimates the actor’s centrality in the network in terms of their number 
of ties (Kapucu, 2006). As it can also be discerned by looking at Figure 2, FEMA 
scored highest in terms of the number of interactions it had during the emergency 
response. There is not a NVOAD member organization in the top 5 organizations, 
even though NVOAD members and the American Red Cross are expected to 
perform in the top five. In the mid 5, there is one NVOAD member – Church World 
Services with a 0.043 centrality score. Although the U.S. State Department was 
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involved in the emergency response, they did not reportedly interact with any 
other organization. 
Table 1. Degree centrality measures of organizations in the network 
  Organization name Degree 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency 7.415 
2 New York City Mayor 0.791 
3 US Department of Health and Human Services 0.491 
4 FEMA Disaster Field Office 0.47 
5 US Army Corps of Engineers 0.47 
… … … 
93 McGuire AFB 0.043 
94 Church World Services 0.043 
95 New York State Senate 0.043 
96 Nassau County Fire Department 0.021 
97 US Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Response 0.021 
… … … 
177 Equal Rights Officer 0 
178 New York State Crime Victims Board 0 
179 US Department of State 0 
180 United Parcel Service 0 
181 US Armed Forces 0 
Mean 0.118 
 
In Table 2, the closeness centrality measures of the top, mid, and lowest five 
organizations in the 9/11 response network are shown. Closeness centrality 
measures the centrality of network actors by determining how close each actor is 
to the other actors in terms of the shortest possible path (Hanneman, 2001). 
Although FEMA has the greatest number of links in the network, it does not score 
the highest in terms of the closest path to every actor in the network. As seen in 
Figure 2 (above), some of the actors are scattered farther from the center (FEMA) 
to the peripheries. Again, there is not a NVOAD member in the top 5, though 
there are some VOADs in the mid 5 organizations of the analysis. 
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Table 2. Closeness centrality measures of organizations in the network 
  Organization name Closeness 
1 New York State Department of Environmental Protection 0.718 
2 New York Stock Exchange 0.718 
3 New York State Department of Sanitation 0.717 
4 New York City Office of Emergency Management 0.713 
5 FEMA Disaster Field Office 0.708 
… … … 
93 Shomburg Black Museum 0.698 
94 Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters 0.698 
95 National Geographic 0.698 
96 Church of Bethlehem 0.698 
97 Service Employees International Union 0.698 
… … … 
177 Equal Rights Officer 0.552 
178 New York State Crime Victims Board 0.552 
179 US Department of State 0.552 
180 New Jersey Port Authority 0.552 
181 The President Bush 0.552 
Mean 0.671 
 
Table 3 (above) shows betweenness centrality measures of the organizations 
in the 9/11 response network. Betweenness centrality measures the position of 
an actor in the network with respect to its geodesic path between other actors, 
and it indicates the extent to which it is capable of acting as a broker (Hanneman, 
2001). The table shows that FEMA has the highest betweenness score meaning 
that it had played an important broker role. The American Red Cross, a NVOAD 
member organization, scored the third highest in its role as a bridge among 
several organizations in the network. Of course, the Red Cross is one of the 
approximately 100 congressionally-chartered organizations and the only nonprofit 
organization with a congressional mandate to provide disaster relief. It has built-in 
communication structures that enable the organization to frequently coordinate 
with government agencies that respond to disasters. 
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Table 3. Betweenness centrality measures of organizations in the network 
  Organization name Betweenness 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency 15.56 
2 New York City Fire Department 2.389 
3 American Red Cross 1.812 
4 Environmental Protection Agency 1.588 
5 New York City Mayor 1.521 
… … … 
93 Joint Information Center 0 
94 Joint Regional Medical Planning Office 0 
95 McGuire AFB 0 
96 Department of Transportation 0 
97 New York City Transit 0 
… … … 
177 Turner Construction 0 
178 US News and World Report 0 
179 Washington Post 0 
180 Yomiuri Shimbun 0 
181 Transcomm 0 
Mean 0.173 
 
In Table 4 the measures of degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality of 
NVOAD member organizations and some state and local VOADs in disaster 
response are presented. The American Red Cross has the highest score in degree 
and betweenness centrality, a high score in closeness, and it is the only 
organization that has played the role of being the bridge in interactions with other 
organizations in the network. Although the World Vision had the least amount of 
ties in the network, it had closer paths to every other actor in the network. This 
means that although the World Vision does not have many interactions with other 
organizations in the network, it is still at a good position to obtain information and 
resources from other actors in the network due to its proximity to other 
organizations with two or more paths. 
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Table 4. Centrality measures of NVOAD members in the 9/11 response network 
Degree 
orders Organization name Degree Closeness Betweenness 
10 American Red Cross 0.342 0.693 1.812 
23 New York City VOAD 0.171 0.693 0 
24 United Methodist Committee on Relief 0.15 0.698 0 
54 Southern Baptist Convention 0.064 0.698 0 
68 United Jewish Appeal 0.043 0.698 0 
75 United Way 0.043 0.698 0 
77 Salvation Army 0.043 0.698 0 
83 Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters 0.043 0.698 0 
84 Church of Scientology 0.043 0.552 0 
94 Church World Services 0.043 0.698 0 
127 Church of the Brethren 0.021 0.697 0 
131 Adventist Disaster Services 0.021 0.552 0 
140 Southern Baptists Kitchens 0.021 0.552 0 
145 New Jersey VOAD 0.021 0.698 0 
163 World Vision 0.021 0.698 0 
 
Table 5. Cliques in 9/11 response network with 4 members 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency, US Army Corps of Engineers, Deployable Tactical Operation Center, Environmental Protection Agency 
2 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Center for Disease Control, 
Occupational Services and Health Administration, Environmental Protection 
Agency 
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Center for Disease Control, Environmental Protection Agency, New York City Department of Health 
4 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Center for Disease Control, US 
Department of Health and Human Services, New York City Department of 
Health 
5 Federal Emergency Management Agency, US Department of Agriculture, New York City Emergency Operations Center, American Red Cross 
6 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Communication Service, Verizon Communications 
7 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Deployable Tactical Operation Center, National Communication Service, Verizon Communications 
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In table 5 (above), cliques of organizations in the 9/11 response network are 
shown. Clique analysis demonstrates subgroups within a network in which all 
members of a subgroup are connected to one another. There were seven core, 
overlapping cliques of four organizations in the network, and the only nonprofit 
organization found was the American Red Cross. Being part of a clique means that 
those specific organizations in a clique have mutual connections with one another 
and most of the cliques in the above table include FEMA – a central organization 
in the network. Therefore, it can be argued that most of the resources flow in 
those cliques, and there is a higher level of communication due to the 
interconnectedness of the organizations. Apart from the American Red Cross, no 
other nonprofit organization seems to take advantage of this level of 
connectedness. 
The analysis of the case of September 11th in the previous section 
demonstrated the limited network centrality of nonprofit organizations in disaster 
response beyond that of the American Red Cross. However, the analysis of 
nonprofit organizations response to Hurricane Katrina in the following section 
may reveal a different network portrait. 
5.2. Nonprofit Organizations Networks in Response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
Below, Figure 3 depicts the network analysis of the emergency responders’ 
network identified by the data in response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The 
tables in this section provide the results of the analysis of the degree, closeness, 
and betweenness centrality measures of actors in the Hurricane Katrina response 
network, the centrality measures of NVOAD members in the network, and the 
cliques of members. 
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Figure 3. Map of NVOADs and other nonprofit organizations in Hurricane Katrina 
Emergency Response Network 
Legends: Red Squares (NVOAD members), Green Squares (Other Non-profit 
Organizations), Dark Red Squares (Other VOADs), Blue Squares (Other 
Organizations) 
The above figure illustrates interactions amongst various organizations 
involved in emergency response during and after Hurricane Katrina. Isolates, 
meaning organizations that have no reported interaction with others, are not 
shown in the figure. The network is less dense in the center compared to the 9/11 
network and has more and larger cliques across the network. However, NVOAD 
member organizations (red) occupy positions in several parts of the network, 
while other VOADs (brown) and nonprofit organizations (green) are similarly 
located. 
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Table 6. Degree centrality measures of organizations in the Hurricane Katrina 
response network 
  Organization name Degree 
1 Florida Special Emergency Response Team 14.483 
2 Federal Emergency Management Agency 11.552 
3 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 8.793 
4 Florida 8.276 
5 American Red Cross 7.069 
… … … 
293 Gulf Shores City 0.172 
294 Local Law Enforcement Agencies (FL) 0.172 
295 New Orleans Capital Area Transit System 0.172 
296 Mississippi Chamber of Commerce 0.172 
297 Perry County (AL) 0.172 
… … … 
577 Warren county (MS) 0 
578 Lawrence County (MS) 0 
579 Wyoming 0 
580 Oxfam America 0 
581 Yazoo County (MS) 0 
Mean 0.314 
 
Table 6 (above) shows the top 5, mid 5, and lowest 5 organizations ordered 
according to their degree centrality measures. Because the number of 
organizations in the network is very large, and most of them are public or for-
profit organizations, the authors decided to only present the upper, middle, and 
lower five scores in each network. Degree centrality estimates the actor’s 
centrality in the network in terms of their number of ties. Here, the Florida State 
Emergency Response Team (FL SERT) and FEMA scored highest in terms of the 
number of interactions they had during emergency response. The American Red 
Cross is the number five organization in the network in terms of its number of 
ties, which is consistent with the September 11th response analysis. Although 
samples of the mid and lowest 5 organizations indicate that not one is a NVOAD 
member, however Table 7 below shows that there are several NVOAD members 
in the mid and low level centrality measures. 
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Table 7. Closeness centrality measures of organizations in the Hurricane Katrina 
response network 
  Organization name Closeness 
1 New Orleans Health Department 0.2 
2 Hancock County (MS) 0.2 
3 Pearl River County (MS) 0.2 
4 Forrest County (MS) 0.2 
5 Mallette Brothers Construction 0.2 
… … … 
293 Veterinary Services 0.172 
294 Florida International University 0.172 
295 Federal Aviation Administration 0.172 
296 Transportation Security Administration 0.172 
297 Private Helicopter Companies 0.172 
… … … 
577 Warren county (MS) 0.172 
578 Lawrence County (MS) 0.172 
579 Wyoming 0.172 
580 Oxfam America 0.172 
581 Yazoo County (MS) 0.172 
Mean 0.185 
 
In Table 7 (above), the closeness centrality measures for the top, mid, and 
lowest five organizations in the Hurricane Katrina response network are 
presented. Closeness centrality measures the centrality of network actors by 
determining how close each actor is to the other actors in terms of the shortest 
possible path (Hanneman, 2001). Although the Florida State Emergency Response 
Team and FEMA have the greatest number of links in the network (degree of 
centrality), they do not score highest in terms of the closest path to every actor in 
the network, because, as it can be seen in Figure 3 (above), some actors are 
scattered farther from the center to the peripheries in the response to Hurricane 
Katrina. The New Orleans Health Department and Hancock County (MS) had the 
closest path to every other actor in the network. Again, there is not a NVOAD 
member in the top 5, though there are some VOADs in the mid 5 and lowest 5 
levels. 
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Table 8. Betweenness centrality measures of organizations in the Hurricane 
Katrina response network 
  Organization name Betweenness 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency 2.589 
2 Florida Special Emergency Response Team 1.791 
3 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 1.358 
4 American Red Cross 1.32 
5 Emergency Management Assistance Compact 0.986 
… … … 
293 Gulf Shores City 0 
294 Leon County Whole Child 0 
295 Lake Charles Regional Airport 0 
296 Lauderdale County (AL 0 
297 Lee County (FL) 0 
… … … 
577 Warren county (MS) 0 
578 World Vision 0 
579 Wyoming 0 
580 Wayne County 0 
581 Yazoo County (MS) 0 
Mean 0.023 
The betweenness centrality measures of the organizations in the Hurricane 
Katrina response network are presented in Table 8. Betweenness centrality 
measures the position of an actor in the network with respect to its geodesic path 
between other actors, and it indicates the extent to which it is capable of acting as 
a broker (Hanneman, 2001). The table shows that FEMA and Florida State 
Emergency Response Team have the highest betweenness scores, meaning that 
they had played important broker role in the network. American Red Cross, a 
NVOAD member organization, has scored the fourth highest in its role acting as a 
bridge among several organizations in the network. 
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Table 9. Centrality measures of NVOAD members in the Hurricane Katrina 
response network 
Degree 
order Organization name Degree Closeness Betweenness 
5 American Red Cross 7.069 0.199 1.320 
33 Salvation Army 0.69 0.199 0.008 
38 Catholic Charities USA 0.69 0.199 0.024 
55 Seventh Day Adventist Church 0.345 0.199 0 
58 Miami VOAD 0.345 0.199 0 
85 Adventist YES Corps 0.345 0.199 0 
115 Adventist Community Services Disaster Response 0.345 0.199 0 
155 Church World Service 0.172 0.199 0 
161 Convoy of Hope 0.172 0.199 0 
170 Florida VOAD 0.172 0.199 0 
197 VOAD 0.172 0.199 0 
202 Baptist Convention Disaster Relief 0.172 0.199 0 
234 Mississippi VOAD 0.172 0.172 0 
237 Christian Disaster Response 0.172 0.199 0 
283 Southern Baptist Convention 0.172 0.172 0 
306 Christian Reformed World Relief Committee 0.172 0.199 0 
313 United Methodist Committee on Relief 0.172 0.199 0 
337 Faith Presbyterian Church 0.172 0.199 0 
465 Southern Baptist Disaster Relief Fund 0 0.172 0 
 
The measures of degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality of NVOAD 
member organizations and some state and local VOADs are presented in table 9 
(above). The American Red Cross has the highest score in all the centrality 
measures, and Catholic Charities USA is the only other organization that played 
the role of being a bridge in interactions of other organizations in the network. As 
a point of clarification, although the Southern Baptist Disaster Relief Fund has a 
0.000 degree centrality score, it has a 0.172 betweenness score, which might not 
make sense. Although scores are normalized to the corresponding network, zero 
is not absolute. 
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Table 10. Cliques in Hurricane Katrina response network with 5 members 
1 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Mississippi 
2 American Red Cross, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Mississippi 
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Mississippi, US Department of Defense 
4 Alabama, American Red Cross, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Mississippi 
5 Alabama, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Mississippi 
6 Alabama, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Mississippi, US Department of Defense 
7 American Red Cross, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Louisiana, Mississippi 
8 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Louisiana, Mississippi, US Coast Guard 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Louisiana, Mississippi, US Department of Defense 
10 Alabama,  Alabama Emergency Management Agency, National Guard (AL), Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Mobile County (AL) 
11 Alabama, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, National Guard (AL), Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Mississippi 
12 Alabama, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Mississippi 
 
Tables 10 and 11 (above) show the cliques of organizations in the Hurricane 
Katrina response network. Clique analysis demonstrates subgroups within a 
network in which all members of a subgroup are connected to one another. There 
were 12 core overlapping cliques of five organizations in the network, and the 
only nonprofit organization represented was the American Red Cross. Also, there 
were 15 core, overlapping cliques of four organizations in the network with 
Catholic Charities USA in one clique and the American Red Cross in four other 
cliques. This indicates that Catholic Charities USA and the American Red Cross 
have a mutual relationship with all members of the cliques they are involved in. 
This kind of clique membership is essential for sharing information, resources, and 
expertise. 
The Hurricane Katrina network analysis shows that the NVOAD structure of 
each network is different, and that NVOAD member organizations have 
participated in the network. However, except for the American Red Cross, they 
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scored low in terms of the number of collaborative interactions and brokerage 
relationships, which is similar to the majority of organizations in the network. 
Table 11. Cliques in Hurricane Katrina response network with 4 members 
1 Broward County (FL), Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida, Florida Special Emergency Response Team 
2 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Okeechobee County (FL) 
3 Broward County (FL), Florida, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Palm Beach County (FL) 
4 US Department of Homeland Security, Florida Special Emergency Response Team, Louisiana, US Coast Guard 
5 Alabama, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, National Guard (AL), Baldwin County (AL) 
6 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency ,Louisiana, Mississippi 
7 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, National Guard (AL), Louisiana, Mississippi 
8 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Mississippi, National Guard (MS) 
9 National Guard (AL), American Red Cross, Louisiana, Mississippi 
10 Alabama, National Guard (AL), American Red Cross, Mississippi 
11 State Troopers (AL), Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Mississippi 
12 
Catholic Charities USA, Corporation for National and Community Services, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Mississippi Emergency Management 
Agency 
13 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Houston Mayor, Texas, US Department of Defense 
14 American Red Cross, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Louisiana, Texas 
15 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Louisiana, Texas, US Department of Defense 
 
Findings of the study indicate that nearly half of the NVOAD agencies 
interacted with others in the Emergency Management networks. The NVOAD 
members are relatively closer to the network center, especially the American Red 
Cross. In addition, most NVOAD agencies have relatively fewer connections in the 
network with less potential to bridge other actors and groups. It is believed that 
investments in developing formal and informal relationships with other actors in 
the network can help the NVOAD agencies have important collaborative links with 
regard to the flow of information and resources. 
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This article reiterates the importance of collaboration among nonprofit 
organizations and other organizations in the response network in terms of sharing 
resources, information, and risk. In order to achieve a higher level of collaborative 
capacity, the American Red Cross can be accepted as a role model in terms of its 
connectivity with other organizations in the network. It is recommended that 
NVOAD organizations set up teams and streamline their efforts at achieving 
connectivity according to the best practices and evaluate their collaborative 
capacity from time to time according to the benchmarking that the best practices 
provide. If successful NVOAD members will be better able to accomplish their 
mission of communication, coordination, collaboration, and cooperation. 
There are several limitations for the findings of this paper. First, situation 
reports might be biased in terms of their interactions because most of these are 
self-reported. Because most situation reports are created by FEMA and ARC, 
those two organizations might appear over-represented in both networks. 
However, it is also expected that FEMA and ARC have important positions in 
networks because of their legal mandates. Second, the interactions of 
organizations recorded in news reports might be questionable in terms of their 
validity. However, they are important source of information with less cost and 
they do illustrate, albeit within media’s perspective, how organizations have 
interacted during the time period of the study. Finally, social network analysis has 
inherent limitations too. It depicts relationships among organizations as ties 
among nodes, but it does not focus much on the attributes of individual 
organizations. However, the strength of this approach precisely lies in this and this 
paper have used it to understand how nonprofit organizations are structurally 
located in the response network and how that explains their effectiveness. 
6. Conclusion  
Nonprofit organizations have had important roles and responsibilities in 
disaster relief throughout American history. Nonprofit organizations were the 
primary first responders during the times when government actors did not carry 
the burden of saving citizen lives and properties. Governments started getting 
involved in early 20th century, and the 21st century ushered in unique challenges 
and complexities, which necessitated a need for the integration of actions of 
response organizations across political jurisdictions and organizational sectors 
under the umbrella of a unified national disaster policy. This paper tracks changes 
in the national disaster policy with regard to the nonprofit sector by looking at the 
roles ascribed to nonprofit organizations in the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the 
National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Response Framework (NRF). Also, 
data collected from major newspapers and organizational reports about inter-
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organizational interactions of emergency management agencies during the 
September 11th attacks and Hurricane Katrina are analyzed by using social 
network analysis tools. The findings of the study indicate that there has been an 
increase in the interactions of National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters 
(NVOAD) network member organizations in keeping with changes in the National 
Response Plan to involve nonprofit organizations in the national disaster planning 
process. 
Nearly half of the NVOAD agencies have reportedly interacted with others in 
the emergency management networks. Moreover, the NVOAD members relatively 
close to the network center in both of the cases studied experienced enhanced 
communication and the acquisition of necessary resources to achieve their 
missions. In contrast, the NVOAD agencies that had relatively few connections in 
the network experienced a limited ability to respond to the disaster. It is 
recommended that the organizations at the center of the network share their best 
practices of collaboration with the other NVOAD members. Investments by the 
NOVAD coalition in developing formal and informal relationships with other 
actors in the network can help NVOAD agencies have important collaborative links 
with regard to the flow of information and resources. The research can be 
furthered by surveying the perceptions of NVOAD members about their 
awareness of the network and their role in national disaster response, as well as 
the extent to which they are using the NVOAD coalition to coordinate their 
activities. 
Network analysis offers a unique opportunity to study the complex nature of 
disaster response and the role of nonprofit organizations in the response effort. 
The next research step is to conduct an in-depth survey of NVOAD member 
organizations focusing on understanding disaster network formation and 
sustainability. It is possible that some of the smaller nonprofit organizations that 
belong to NVOAD are overlooked by the data sources, and researchers should 
look at these smaller organizations for case analysis. Lastly, future research should 
focus on conducting an in-depth analysis with some description of network 
positions and case analysis of the organizations with high scores and the ones 
with low centrality scores. This analysis would offer the opportunity to discover 
best practices used by nonprofit organizations to improve emergency 
management network performance and to identify barriers to enhanced network 
performance.  
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